Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis

In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism

Ecological psychology is radical enough: A reply to radical enactivists

Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified

The history and philosophy of ecological psychology

Ecological Psychology is an embodied, situated, and non-representational approach pioneered by J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson. This theory aims to offer a third way beyond cognitivism and behaviorism for understanding cognition. The theory started with the rejection of the premise of the poverty of the stimulus, the physicalist conception of the stimulus, and the passive character of the perceiver of mainstream theories of perception. On the contrary, the main principles of ecological psychology are the continuity of perception and action, the organism-environment system as unit of analysis, the study of affordances as the objects of perception, combined with an emphasis on perceptual learning and development. In this paper, first, we analyze the philosophical and psychological influences of ecological psychology: pragmatism, behaviorism, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. Second, we summarize the main concepts of the approach and their historical development following the academic biographies of the proponents. Finally, we highlight the most significant developments of this psychological tradition. We conclude that ecological psychology is one of the most innovative approaches in the psychological field, as it is reflected in its current influence in the contemporary embodied and situated cognitive sciences, where the notion of affordance and the work of E. J. Gibson and J. J. Gibson is considered as a historical antecedent.This study was supported by a 2018 Leonardo Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators, BBVA Foundation (the foundation accepts no responsibility for the opinions, statements and contents included in the project, and/or the results thereof, which are entirely the responsibility of the authors), the Projects PSI2013-43742 and FFI2016-80088-P funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and the FiloLab Group of Excellence, Spain funded by the Universidad de Granada, Spain.2018-1

Affordances and Organizational Functions

In this paper, we bring together the concepts of affordance from ecological psychology and function from the organizational approach to philosophy of biology into a single integrative framework. This integration allows us to account for the biological basis of the notion of affordance, offering theoretical tools to address the normative interrelations between theorganisms and their environments

Introduction to the special issue "cognition and technology: A 4E perspective”

In this paper, we present the main contributions that are part of the special issue "Cognition and technology: A 4E perspective" . 4E cognition or the embodied and embedded cognitive sciences aim to make sense of the mind as constituted by bodily and environmental aspects. This approach to the mind offers some challenges to our current understanding of technology, and this special issue includes an analysis of key epistemic, ontological, and methodological aspects of 4E cognition in relation to the use of technology.2020-2

Previous steps toward an affordance-based approach to concepts

Since some years ago, there have been several approaches that took affordances as a basis for explaining cognitive processes beyond perception and action, such as language, imagination, social practices, etc. Another key aspect of our mental life that is susceptible to be explained from an affordance-based perspective is the nature of concepts. The perceptual basis of concepts is a traditional theme in the history of philosophy, one that has been approached from either a nativist or an empiricist perspective. Here, we want to offer the minimal methodological and conceptual requirements for approaching the problem of the perceptual basis of concepts from an affordance-based perspective that overcome the traditional nativist vs. empiricist debate. We argue that affordances are a key idea to make sense of our experience, but also to make sense of our concepts, as they provide the materials from which we can build them up. For this, we sketch our own methodological and theoretical requirements or conditions for offering a successful affordance-based approach to concepts, and we offer a positive, constructive story to develop the idea in the future. In particular, we propose the idea of embodied concepts as a non-discursive link between basic and discursive cognition. These embodied concepts are a kind of bodily know-how in which we patternize the world. This bodily know-how is formed thanks to the experience we gain through dealing with affordances. Thus, embodied concepts can be considered as affordance-based states that are the missing link between merely reactive contentless states and discursive, contentful states.BBVA - Proyecto ECOCONCEPT2022-2

The History and Philosophy of Ecological Psychology

Ecological Psychology is an embodied, situated, and non-representational approach pioneered by J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson. This theory aims to offer a third way beyond cognitivism and behaviorism for understanding cognition. The theory started with the rejection of the premise of the poverty of the stimulus, the physicalist conception of the stimulus, and the passive character of the perceiver of mainstream theories of perception. On the contrary, the main principles of ecological psychology are the continuity of perception and action, the organism-environment system as unit of analysis, the study of affordances as the objects of perception, combined with an emphasis on perceptual learning and development. In this paper, first, we analyze the philosophical and psychological influences of ecological psychology: pragmatism, behaviorism, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. Second, we summarize the main concepts of the approach and their historical development following the academic biographies of the proponents. Finally, we highlight the most significant developments of this psychological tradition. We conclude that ecological psychology is one of the most innovative approaches in the psychological field, as it is reflected in its current influence in the contemporary embodied and situated cognitive sciences, where the notion of affordance and the work of E. J. Gibson and J. J. Gibson is considered as a historical antecedent

Chronic Exercise Improves Mitochondrial Function and Insulin Sensitivity in Brown Adipose Tissue

The aim of the present work was to study the consequences of chronic exercise training on factors involved in the regulation of mitochondrial remodeling and biogenesis, as well as the ability to produce energy and improve insulin sensitivity and glucose uptake in rat brown adipose tissue (BAT). Male Wistar rats were divided into two groups: (1) control group (C; n = 10) and (2) exercise-trained rats (ET; n = 10) for 8 weeks on a motor treadmill (five times per week for 50 min). Exercise training reduced body weight, plasma insulin, and oxidized LDL concentrations. Protein expression of ATP-independent metalloprotease (OMA1), short optic atrophy 1 (S-OPA1), and dynamin-related protein 1 (DRP1) in BAT increased in trained rats, and long optic atrophy 1 (L-OPA1) and mitofusin 1 (MFN1) expression decreased. BAT expression of nuclear respiratory factor type 1 (NRF1) and mitochondrial transcription factor A (TFAM), the main factors involved in mitochondrial biogenesis, was higher in trained rats compared to controls. Exercise training increased protein expression of sirtuin 1 (SIRT1), peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor γ coactivator 1α (PGC1α) and AMP-activated protein kinase (pAMPK/AMPK ratio) in BAT. In addition, training increased carnitine palmitoyltransferase II (CPT II), mitochondrial F1 ATP synthase α-chain, mitochondrial malate dehydrogenase 2 (mMDH) and uncoupling protein (UCP) 1,2,3 expression in BAT. Moreover, exercise increased insulin receptor (IR) ratio (IRA/IRB ratio), IRA-insulin-like growth factor 1 receptor (IGF-1R) hybrids and p42/44 activation, and decreased IGF-1R expression and IR substrate 1 (p-IRS-1) (S307) indicating higher insulin sensitivity and favoring glucose uptake in BAT in response to chronic exercise training. In summary, the present study indicates that chronic exercise is able to improve the energetic profile of BAT in terms of increased mitochondrial function and insulin sensitivity